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 Abstract 
According to the standard view in philosophy, intentionality is the mark of genuine action. In 
psychology, human cognition and agency are now widely explained in terms of the workings 
of two distinct systems (or types of processes), and intentionality is not a central notion in this 
dual-system theory. Further, it is often claimed, in psychology, that most human actions are 
automatic, rather than consciously controlled. This raises pressing questions. Does the dual-
system theory preserve the philosophical account of intentional action? How much of our 
behavior is intentional according to this view? And what is the role of consciousness? I will 
propose here a revised account of intentional action within the dual-system framework, and 
we will see that most of our behavior can qualify as intentional, even if most of it is 
automatic. An important lesson will be that philosophical accounts of intentional action need 
to pay more attention to the role of consciousness in action. 
1. Introduction 
The contemporary philosophy of action has revolved around the notion of intentional action, 
and it is widely agreed that intentionality distinguishes genuine action from mere behavior 
and mere happenings. In cognitive and social psychology, human cognition and agency are 
now widely explained in terms of the workings of two distinct systems (or types of mental 
processes). System 1, as it is often called, is characterized by processes that are fast, 
effortless, automatic, and unconscious. Examples include intuitive judgments, the recognition 
of faces and facial expressions, emotional reactions, fight-or-flight responses, and overlearned 
routines (such as typing a word, playing an instrument, driving a car, and so on). System 2 is 
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engaged in processes that are slow, deliberate, controlled, and conscious. Paradigmatic 
examples are conscious and deliberate reasoning, the solution of novel and difficult problems, 
and the exercise of self-control. This dual-system framework has been deployed successfully 
in many areas of empirical research and I will assume, here, that it is on the right track in 
providing an empirically adequate account of human cognition and agency. (For an extensive 
overview and review see Evans 2008; see also Sloman 1996, Kahneman 2011, Evans & 
Stanovich 2013.) 
Interestingly, the notion of intentionality does not occupy a theoretical role in the dual-
system framework. Occasionally, however, some researchers in this area identify intentional 
actions with actions that are consciously controlled. Further, in the empirical literature it is 
often claimed that most of our behavior is driven by System 1 processes that are automatic 
and not consciously controlled. Given this, we face obvious and pressing questions. Is the 
philosophical account of intentional action compatible with the dual-system theory? If so, 
how can the dual-system theory account for intentional action? And what is the role of 
consciousness? If we simply identify intentional actions with consciously controlled System 2 
outputs, we face the unpalatable conclusion that most of our behavior is not intentional, 
provided that most of our behavior is automatic and driven by System 1, as claimed in the 
empirical literature. We face, then, the further question of how much of our behavior can 
qualify as intentional within the dual-system framework. 
In order to address those questions, we will need to get clearer about the role of 
consciousness in the dual-system theory and in intentional action. First, I will outline the 
standard view of intentional action, the dual-system theory, and the role of consciousness in 
the dual-system-theory. In order to discuss the role of consciousness in intentional action, I 
will consider five cases in which the activation of a social stereotype influences behavior in 
different ways and with varying degrees of conscious awareness. This will allow us to see 
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how intentional action can be captured within the dual-system theory, and it will allow us to 
see that most of our everyday behavior can qualify as intentional, even if most of it is 
automatic. In particular, on the basis of the discussion of those five cases, I will a propose 
revised version of the standard view according to which automatic action (or so called 
“automatic goal pursuit”) can qualify as derivatively intentional, if it has an appropriate 
history of habit formation.1 An important general lesson will be that philosophical accounts of 
intentional action need to consider the role of consciousness in action more carefully, both in 
the guidance of action and in the history of habit formation. Further, the discussion will point 
to an important distinction between two kinds of intentions, and we will see how intentional 
action and goal-directed behavior can come apart. 
2. The standard view of intentional action 
In the philosophy of mind and action, it is generally agreed that intentionality is the mark of 
genuine agency. For some time, it was also generally agreed that intentional agency can be 
explained in terms of the roles of the agent’s desires and beliefs (largely due to the influence 
of Davidson 1963). In particular, it was widely assumed that to act intentionally is to act for a 
reason, and that acting for a reason is to be explained in terms of causation and rationalization 
by the agent’s desires and beliefs. It is still widely held that there is a close connection 
between intentional action and acting for reasons—that intentional actions are usually 
performed for reasons. But the underlying claim that intentions can be reduced to desires and 
beliefs is now widely rejected (largely due to the influence of Bratman 1987). According to 
most contemporary versions of this standard theory of action, intentions play a crucial and 
irreducible role in practical reasoning, long-term planning, and in the initiation and guidance 
                                                
1 For related but nevertheless quite different approaches to this complex of issues see, for instance, Carruthers 
2009, Frankish 2009, Evans 2010, and Hommel 2017. 
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of action. On this view, the intentionality of action is to be explained in terms of the initiation 
and guidance by intentions, construed as irreducible mental states (Bratman 1987, Mele 1992, 
Enç 2003). In what follows, I will assume this as the current version of the standard view. 
Philosophers of action have tended to assume that most of our everyday behavior 
qualifies as intentional, partly because they have assumed that the standard view can 
accommodate the intentionality of habitual actions. Davidson, for instance, noted that “we 
cannot suppose that whenever an agent acts intentionally he goes through a process of 
deliberation or reasoning” (1978: 85). On his view, actions are intentional only if they are 
caused and rationalized by the relevant desires and beliefs. But it is not required that the agent 
consciously considers the relevant desires and beliefs in reasoning. Rather, “if someone acts 
with an intention, he must have attitudes and beliefs from which, had he been aware of them 
and had the time, he could have reasoned that his action was desirable” (1978: 85). 
Davidson’s example is an agent who adds spice to a stew with the intention of improving the 
taste. We can certainly imagine that this action is highly habitual, such that the agent’s mind 
is preoccupied with something else. The action would nevertheless seem to be intentional 
(more on this below, in section 6). Proponents of the view that intentions are irreducible 
usually offer a similar qualification. According to the current standard view, intentions are 
defined in terms of their functional roles, which include, most importantly, the initiation and 
guidance of action (Bratman 1987, Mele 1992, Enç 2003). According to the corresponding 
qualification, it is not required that the agent is consciously aware of the intention. It is 
sufficient, that is, if the action is initiated and guided by an intention that is consciously 
accessible (see Mele 2009: Ch. 2). 
With this qualification in place, the standard view can accommodate the intentionality 
of habitual actions. For, even if most of our everyday behavior is habitual, as it seems, it is 
plausible to assume that most of our behavior is intentional, because it is plausible to assume 
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that most habitual actions are initiated and guided by intentions that are consciously 
accessible (such that the agent could tell us his or her intention, if we asked). 
3. Dual-system theory 
Dual-system theories “abound in cognitive and social psychology” (Evans 2008). They were 
first proposed to account for biases in logical reasoning, but are now widely deployed in the 
explanation of human cognition, decision-making, and agency. There are numerous versions 
of this view, but they share the same basic structure. Until recently, this structure was usually 
described by means of dichotomies. System 1 processes were characterized as fast, effortless, 
automatic, and unconscious. System 2 processes were characterized as slow, deliberate, 
controlled, and conscious. More recently, this way of capturing the core of the dual-system 
theory has come under attack (for a summary of those criticisms and references see Evans & 
Stanovich 2013). Proponents of the view have acknowledged some of the criticisms, and they 
have adjusted the presentation of the view accordingly. In what follows, I will base my 
discussion on the recent accounts of the theory provided by Evans & Stanovich 2013 and 
Kahneman 2011. 
According to Evans & Stanovich, the mentioned dichotomies capture “correlates” of the 
two systems, but they should not be taken as definitive (necessary and sufficient conditions). 
On their current view, the defining features of System 2 processes are “cognitive decoupling” 
and the “strong loading on the working memory resources that this requires” (2013: 226). 
This is in line with Kahneman’s view, in which System 2 processes are defined in terms of 
the kind of effort that is required in the simultaneous maintenance of several (and therefore 
decoupled) representations in working memory, and that is characteristic of conscious 
problem solving, reasoning, and deliberation (2011: Ch. 2). Evans & Stanovich define System 
1 now solely in terms of “autonomy”. By this they mean, roughly, that System 1 responses are 
triggered by their stimulus without the involvement or intervention of System 2 (2013: 236). 
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This coheres, again, with Kahneman’s account, according to which the defining and unifying 
feature of System 1 processes is their automaticity (2011: Ch. 1).2 
How do the two systems lead to action? The emerging consensus is that System 2 is 
endowed with the top-down control to inhibit or override System 1 processes. This is what 
Evans & Stanovich call a default-interventionist architecture.3 On their account, System 1 
usually provides the “default response” to a given task or situation, which arises quickly and 
intuitively. System 2 may intervene by overriding or inhibiting the default response, if there is 
sufficient time and if the agent is motivated to engage in effortful System 2 processing. On 
their view, “most behavior will accord with defaults, and intervention will occur only when 
difficulty, novelty, and motivation combine to command the resources of working memory” 
(2013: 237). Kahneman proposes a similar architecture. On his view, System 1 continuously 
and automatically generates “suggestions” (impressions, desires, and intuitions), which are 
often endorsed by System 2 “with little or no modification” (2011: 24). System 2 engages in 
effortful processing and takes over when difficulties arise, when errors are detected, or when 
System 1 fails to provide a default response. In what follows, I will assume that a default-
interventionist architecture provides the correct account of how the two systems lead to 
action, and the details of this view will be further specified and qualified in due course. 
                                                
2 Evans & Stanovich (2013) now prefer the terminology of dual-processes, because they do not mean to imply 
that there are two separate systems in the brain. System 1, in particular, is not one unified mechanism, but an 
array of automatic processes or modules. Kahneman acknowledges this, but he nevertheless keeps the 
terminology of systems. This is common practice, and I will continue to use the systems terminology as well. 
3 Evans & Stanovich distinguish between two architectures: parallel-competitive and default-interventionist. 
According to the former, the two systems simply compete for control, in parallel, and there is no systematic 
interaction. Evans & Stanovich argue convincingly that this is implausible (2013: 237). On this view, it seems 
mysterious how System 2 can ever gain control over behavior, because System 1 is always quicker than System 
2. Further, System 2 operates with precious working memory resources, and one would expect that such a high-
level system is provided with a more systematic access to the motor control system. 
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4. An obvious but unsuccessful proposal 
From what we have seen so far, it seems already clear that the standard view of intentional 
action and the dual-system theory are not incompatible. According to one obvious proposal 
on how to locate or capture intentional action within the dual-system framework, intentional 
actions are simply System 2 outputs: actions that are generated by System 2 processes. It 
seems that some of the researchers who work on automaticity and dual-system theory hold 
this view of intentional action. It seems that way, because automatic processes are sometimes 
contrasted with processes that are consciously controlled and intentional (see Bargh 1994, 
Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Bargh 2005, Evans & Stanovich 2013, for instance).4 As 
mentioned, the reduction of intentions to desires and beliefs is now widely rejected in 
philosophy, but it is still commonly assumed that intentions are usually based on desires. One 
could capture this in accord with the view just outlined by adding the assumption that System 
1 generates desires that may or may not be endorsed by System 2, assuming, further, that the 
endorsement of a desire may consist simply in the formation of an intention to pursue the 
desired goal.5 
However, as already indicated, this view has a serious drawback. In the empirical 
literature, it is often claimed that the great majority of our behavior is automatic. In an 
influential review article, Bargh & Chartrand (1999) evoked the “unbearable automaticity of 
being”, referring to Baumeister et al. (1998), who estimated that only about five percent of 
our behavior is consciously controlled. Similarly, Aarts et al. (2005: 466) confidently assert 
                                                
4 According to Bargh 1994, the absence of intentionality is one of the “four horsemen” of automaticity. In this 
relatively early review of automaticity research, Bargh characterized intentionality in terms of conscious control. 
In later work, Bargh mentions intentionality only in passing, usually as synonymous with conscious control. 
5 The endorsement of a desire may of course involve more than that, such as the reflective judgment that the 
desired end is desirable or good. The proposed claim here is that endorsement may consist only in the formation 
of the corresponding intention. 
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that “most of our social behavior occurs in an automatic fashion and originates in the 
unconscious”. If we identified intentional actions with System 2 outputs, and if we contrasted 
thereby automatic System 1 outputs with intentional System 2 outputs, we would have to 
conclude that the great majority of our actions are not intentional. Moreover, the implicit 
identification of intentional actions with consciously controlled actions is at odds with the 
mentioned qualification of the standard view, according to which intentional action does not 
require conscious awareness of the relevant mental attitudes (see section 2). And this shows, 
in turn, that one could not accommodate the intentionality of habitual actions if one simply 
identified intentional actions with System 2 outputs. 
Further, it is questionable that all desires are generated by System 1 and that the 
endorsement of desires is always due to System 2. Philosophers have long noted that many of 
our desires appear to be reason-responsive, and there is now a considerable amount of 
empirical evidence in support of this view (see Dill & Holton 2014). Some desires simply 
vanish when one learns that the desired object is unattainable, or when one judges that 
something else would be better, for instance. Some desires, that is, are responsive to the 
judgments and intentions generated by System 2, and some desires may even be generated by 
System 2. Given this, it would simply be a mistake to assume that all desires are first 
generated by System 1, and then, perhaps, endorsed by System 2. 
Concerning the endorsement of desires, there is no good reason to think that this is 
always a System 2 process. System 2 processes are effortful in the sense that they involve 
cognitive decoupling and a strong load on working memory. It seems clear that we often 
endorse desires, intuitions, and other “default suggestions” consciously and swiftly, without 
engaging in effortful reasoning or cognition. Given this, the endorsement of desires need not 
be a System 2 process. Given, further, that the endorsement of a desire may consist simply in 
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the formation of an intention to pursue the desired goal, this means that the formation of an 
intention need not be a System 2 process. 
To see why this is plausible, note that many System 1 processes can be flexible, in the 
sense that their execution can be sensitive to the features of the particular situation and to the 
agent’s beliefs about how to pursue or realize the goal. Examples from priming studies will 
help to illustrate this point. It has been shown, for instance, that when subjects are primed, in 
a first task, with words that are related to rudeness, kindness, helping, or so, they are more 
likely to engage in rude, polite, or helping behaviors in a subsequent task (Aarts et al. 2005, 
Bargh & Williams 2006).6 Rude, polite, or helping behaviors are typically sensitive to the 
features of the particular situation and to the agent’s background beliefs about how to pursue 
the action in the given situation. This kind of flexibility cannot be explained in terms of rigid 
stimulus-response associations, which map a particular type of input (or situation) to a 
particular type of output (or action). For this reason, most researchers in this field agree that 
such actions are instances of “automatic goal pursuit”: actions that are to be explained in 
terms of the activation of goal representations that initiate and guide the execution of the 
behavior (Custers & Aarts 2010).7 On this view, the activation of the stimulus leads to the 
                                                
6 Recently, some of the seminal experiments in this area have been called into question. Several attempts at 
replication have either failed or produced only significantly smaller effects. There is, however, also a very large 
body of research that corroborates the findings. Even if the effects are small and difficult to reproduce, it seems 
rather unlikely that there are no real effects that underlie the results in this area of research. For a recent 
discussion of those issues see Open Science Collaboration 2015. 
7 According to Levy (2014: 118, note 5), the evidence does not indicate automatic goal pursuit, because the 
actions in question are merely modulated by the priming. This is a plausible interpretation of many of the classic 
findings. For instance, in one such experiment, priming influenced the accuracy of the task performance by 
influencing the speed of the task completion. But it can be argued that even in cases of this kind a non-conscious 
goal was “superimposed on an already activated parallel conscious task goal” (Bargh et al. 2001: 1024). In other 
experiments, an interpretation in terms of modulation is rather implausible. For instance, the subliminal priming 
of cooperation or helping behavior is not plausibly interpreted as a mere modulation (see Bargh et al. 2001, 
Aarts et al. 2005). 
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performance of the action indirectly, by way of the activation of the relevant goal, such that 
the resulting goal-pursuit is sensitive to the agent’s beliefs about how that goal is to be 
pursued or realized in the circumstances. (Direct empirical evidence for this kind of flexibility 
is provided by Hassin et al. 2009.) 
Now, according to one standard definition in psychology, goals are “internal 
representations of desired states” (Austin & Vancouver 1996: 338). According to another, a 
goal is the “representation of a future object that the organism is committed to approach or 
avoid” (Elliot & Fryer 2008: 244). The former corresponds, very roughly, to the philosophical 
notion of desire. The latter corresponds to the philosophical notion of intention, again very 
roughly.8 We might say here that the definition of goals in psychology is ambiguous between 
the philosophical notions of desire and intention. Or, more positively, we might just as well 
say that the definition encompasses both the philosophical notion of desire and of intention. 
However, talk of automatic goal-pursuit suggests that the scientists in this particular research 
area have in mind the formation of a representational state that initiates and guides the pursuit 
of the relevant action—a state, in other words, that commits the agent to the pursuit of a 
particular action. Given this, we can say that the scientists in this area agree that automatic 
goal-pursuit, which is a paradigmatic System 1 process, is to be explained in terms of the 
automatic activation of intentions. 
One might, of course, reject a definition of intentions solely in terms of the functional 
roles of initiation and guidance, and insist, for instance, that genuine intentions must be 
consciously formed or accessed. But this would not facilitate real progress. For if one simply 
claimed that intentional action requires conscious intention, without further qualification, one 
                                                
8 See Bratman 1987 and Mele 2009, for instance, who stress this element of commitment, or of having settled the 
question of which action to pursue, which distinguishes intentions from desires. 
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could not accommodate the apparent intentionality of habitual actions, and one would once 
again face the undesirable conclusion that most of our actions are not intentional. 
We have seen that the standard view of intentional action is clearly not incompatible 
with the dual-system theory. But a satisfactory account of intentional action within this theory 
has to be more nuanced than the view considered in this section. In order to make constructive 
progress on this, we need to get clearer about the role of consciousness in the dual-system 
theory and in intentional action. 
5. The role of consciousness in the dual-system theory 
In the previous section, we have seen that consciousness is not a distinguishing feature of 
System 2, as System 1 processes may also involve consciousness. The default suggestions of 
System 1 appear often in consciousness, and if one endorses such suggestions by consciously 
forming a judgment or an intention without effortful reasoning, then the endorsement is itself 
part of the System 1 process. What is distinctive of System 2 processes is, more specifically, 
that one consciously conducts individual steps of reasoning in an effortful process that 
requires the simultaneous maintenance of decoupled representations in working memory. 
What kind of consciousness is at issue here? 
In philosophy, it is common to distinguish between phenomenal and access 
consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is usually characterized in terms of what it is like 
to have a certain experience (such as the distinctive quality of a certain visual or auditory 
perception). According to common characterizations of access consciousness, a representation 
is conscious if it is available for reasoning, decision-making, and the control of action 
(including verbal report). Access consciousness is a functional notion—it specifies the 
functional roles of conscious mental states. 
In a review article, Evans (2008) points out that there is an operational definition of 
consciousness that is shared, at least implicitly, by most dual-system theories: “System 2 
 12 
thinking requires access to a central working memory system of limited capacity” and “what 
we are aware of at any given time is represented in this working memory, through which 
conscious thinking flows in a sequential manner” (2008: 259). This is a definition in terms of 
access and it specifies how representations become accessible for further processing—
namely, by virtue of being in the central working memory system. 
Evans notes, further, that this view is closely associated with the global workspace 
theory of consciousness. According to this view, a representation is conscious if it is 
“broadcast” in the “global workspace”, which makes it available to a wide range of consumer 
systems (Baars 1997). Initially, this talk of broadcasting in the global workspace was merely a 
heuristic metaphor. But more recently this view has been developed into a global neuronal 
workspace theory of consciousness, which specifies concrete neural mechanisms for the 
workspace and for broadcasting. This theory is empirically well-motivated and it has been 
successfully deployed in the neuroscientific study of consciousness (Dehaene & Naccache 
2001, Baars 2002). There has been some debate about whether or not the workspace can 
simply be identified with the central working memory system, but it is agreed that working 
memory is a central component of the workspace (Baars & Franklin 2003, Levy 2014). And 
as Evans notes, this “association of conscious thought with such a working memory explains 
the slow, sequential, and low-capacity nature of System 2” (2008: 259). 
So, the role of consciousness in the dual-system theory is captured by an operational 
definition of consciousness that coheres with the philosophical notion of access consciousness 
and with the global (neuronal) workspace theory of consciousness. But can we plausibly 
restrict our considerations to access consciousness? 
Note, first of all, that we are interested in the role of consciousness in the initiation and 
guidance of action. That is just to say that we are interested in the functional role of 
consciousness, which is precisely what a definition of access consciousness is supposed to 
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capture. Note, moreover, that we are concerned here primarily with the roles of desires, 
beliefs, and intentions. To insist that phenomenal consciousness must play a role would 
commit one to the rather implausible view that conscious access to desires, beliefs, and 
intentions is always accompanied by phenomenal consciousness. 
However, one may grant that access consciousness is all that matters in most cases and 
hold that there are other cases in which mental states influence or motivate behavior in virtue 
of their phenomenal quality. Suppose, for instance, that certain aesthetic or moral judgments 
motivate actions in virtue of the fact that they are based on aesthetic perceptions or moral 
sentiments with certain phenomenal qualities. Would this not show that phenomenal 
consciousness can play an important and irreducible role in action? 
What is at issue in such cases is always the “functional correlate” of the phenomenal 
experience—that is, the functional role that correlates with the phenomenal quality in 
question (see Chalmers 1995). It may well be that a mental state has a particular functional 
role in virtue of having a certain phenomenal quality. But its role in the initiation and 
guidance of action is still its functional role. Note that there are two different explanatory 
relations in play here. A mental state plays a role in the initiation and guidance of action in 
virtue of being a mental state with that functional role, and it may have and play this 
functional role in virtue of having a certain phenomenal quality. But its role in action remains 
its functional role. The explanatory relation between the phenomenal quality and the action is 
indirect, mediated by its functional role, which is the functional correlate of the phenomenal 
quality in question. 
Note, finally, that the functional role of a conscious intention is by no means exhausted 
by the initiation and guidance of action (including verbal report). In particular, by virtue of 
being a conscious intention it has the functional role of being available for further deliberation 
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and decision-making, and it plays this functional role by virtue of being broadcast in the 
global workspace (or central working memory system). 
6. The role of consciousness in intentional action 
Our main question is how to account for intentional action within the dual-system theory, and 
we have seen that we need to get clearer about the role of consciousness. As mentioned, in 
section 2, it is common to qualify the standard view with the claim that intentional action does 
not require conscious deliberation or conscious awareness of the relevant intention. The fact 
that this is usually added as a qualification suggests that it is usually taken for granted that 
paradigmatic instances of intentional action are initiated and guided by conscious intentions 
(and, perhaps, reasons). I share this assumption, at least as a starting point for the present 
investigation.9 In the previous section, we have seen that the role of consciousness in the dual-
system theory is captured by the global (neuronal) workspace theory of consciousness, and I 
have argued that the implicit restriction to access consciousness is unproblematic. With this 
framework in place, we can now address our main question in a more systematic and nuanced 
manner. We will consider a series of five cases, in which behavior is influenced by the 
activation of a social stereotype in five different ways, with varying degrees of consciousness. 
This distinction between five cases is not exhaustive. But it will cover the full range from 
automatic and unconscious goal pursuit to conscious and deliberate action, and it will thereby 
allow us to consider the full range from full System 1 to full System 2 engagement. 
As mentioned, experiments show that behavior can be influenced by priming with 
words that are associated with concepts such as rudeness, politeness, or helping. Likewise, it 
                                                
9 This assumption is in line with commonsense or folk intuitions about intentional action. The empirical 
evidence provided by Malle & Knobe 1996 and Malle et al. 2000 suggests that, according to the folk concept, an 
action is intentional and based on reasons only if the agent is aware of the relevant intention and reasons. 
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has been shown that behavior can be influenced by priming with words that are associated 
with social stereotypes concerning race, gender, or social class, and the same has been shown 
for the activation of such stereotypes by the presence of group members and perception of 
group features, such as skin color (Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Aarts et al. 2005, Bargh & 
Williams 2006). Generally speaking, stereotyping involves generalization by way of 
categorization and association, and social stereotypes are commonly defined as 
“generalizations about the shared attributes of a group of people” (Judd & Park 1993). For 
instance, a person is perceived as Asian, female, or working class, due to certain superficial 
features, and this categorization is associated with features such as being good at math, bad at 
driving, or the like.10 A stereotype is said to be activated when the perception or activation of 
one feature automatically activates an associated feature (or features). Experiments have 
shown that stereotypes can be activated without the subject’s awareness, and they have shown 
that both the conscious and the unconscious activation of stereotypes tends to influence 
behavior. In the empirical literature, it is generally assumed that the influence on behavior 
may be mediated by one of the following two mechanisms (Bargh et al. 2001, Aarts et al. 
2005, Bargh 2005, Bargh & Williams 2006). First, stereotypes may become associated with 
behavioral tendencies, such that the activation of a stereotypical feature automatically 
activates directly the associated behavioral tendency. Second, it is now assumed that 
stereotypes may also become associated with goal representations, such that the activation of 
the stereotype leads to behavior by activating the goal and subsequent goal pursuit. The main 
difference between the two mechanisms concerns behavioral flexibility. The first mechanism 
is often described as rigid, in the sense that the activation of the stimulus directly activates a 
tendency to perform a certain type of behavior. The second mechanism is flexible, in the 
                                                
10 Social stereotypes need not be negative, and they need not be inaccurate. But they tend to be oversimplified 
overgeneralizations (Judd & Park 1993). 
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sense that it is sensitive to background beliefs about how to pursue or realize a goal in a given 
situation. To use the example from above, the activation of a social stereotype may become 
associated with the tendency to perform a certain type of rude behavior. Or, according to the 
second mechanism, the activation of the stereotype may automatically activate the goal to be 
rude, such that the pursuit of that goal is guided by background beliefs about how the goal is 
to be pursued in the given situation. The empirical evidence suggests that both mechanisms 
can operate entirely without conscious awareness. This evidence on stereotype activation is an 
important part of the evidence on implicit bias (Greenwald & Banaji 1995, Petty et al. 2008, 
for instance). The discussion of such cases will make it clear that an account of intentional 
action within the dual-system theory provides also a useful and plausible framework for how 
to interpret and diagnose the pernicious influence that implicit biases can have on our 
behavior. 
Before we proceed, let me stress that the main purpose of considering the following five 
cases is to explore the various possibilities in the theoretical landscape, as it were—
possibilities concerning the role of consciousness in intentional action and concerning the 
underlying mechanisms. In particular, the distinction between cases 4 and 5 will be based on 
the distinction between the two possible mechanisms of automatic goal pursuit just 
mentioned. I will provide references to empirical evidence, where possible, but it should be 
noted that all questions concerning the exact mechanisms and concerning whether, or to what 
extent, human agency instantiates any of those five cases are empirical questions—and most 
of them will remain open empirical questions for some time to come. 
Case 1: Full awareness and deliberate action 
In this first case, the agent is aware of the stereotype activation and its influence leads to 
action by way of conscious deliberation. Suppose, for instance, that the agent encounters a 
member of a stereotyped group and that this automatically activates the associated stereotype. 
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The activation of the stereotype is broadcast, in the global workspace (or working memory), 
and this instigates conscious deliberation about how to respond, in this situation. The 
deliberation is conducted by System 2 and the individual steps of the deliberative process are 
broadcast. This, we may assume, results in the conscious formation of an intention, which is 
then executed with conscious awareness. 
In this case, the action is initiated and guided by a conscious intention, and this 
intention is based on conscious deliberation. Everyone would agree, I take it, that the action in 
this case is clearly intentional in the fullest sense.11 Note, though, that not all of the mentioned 
features are necessary to support the verdict that the action is intentional. According to the 
standard qualification of the standard view (see section 2), initiation and guidance by an 
accessible intention is sufficient for intentional action. When we turn to case 3 we will see 
that this is in need of further qualification. But it is uncontroversial that initiation and 
guidance by a conscious intention is sufficient, and that conscious deliberation is not 
required. This is why it would be appropriate to describe the action in this case as intentional 
and deliberate or as intentional in the fullest sense. 
Note that we do not assume that System 2 intervenes by inhibiting a default System 1 
response. We may assume that System 2 takes over either because the agent is motivated to 
engage in deliberation, or because the stereotype activation fails to generate a default 
response. In either case, the core capacity of System 2 to conduct individual steps of 
reasoning in working memory is fully engaged, but the process is nevertheless not a pure 
System 2 process. In conscious deliberation, we consider reasons and we evaluate them in 
accord with certain rules (principles or normative standards). Typically, we are unaware of 
                                                
11 This verdict is supported by the standard view of intentional action, as outlined in section 2, and by all its main 
rivals in the philosophy of action. Further, it is supported by the empirical evidence on the folk concept of 
intentional action provided by Malle & Knobe 1996 and Malle et al. 2000. 
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why or how we retrieve certain consideration as reasons and we are unaware of why or how 
we select the underlying rules. The relevant reasons simply appear in consciousness, and the 
relevant rules are usually operative in the background. The retrieval of reasons and the 
selection of rules has to be conducted by System 1, even in fully conscious deliberation. 
Otherwise, we would face a regress of consciously choosing reasons and rules, and 
consciously choosing reasons and rules for choosing those reasons and rules, and so on. 
Given this, it is clear that no cognitive process can be a pure System 2 process. 
Case 2: Full awareness and no deliberation 
Suppose now that the agent is aware of the stereotype activation, but that System 2 does not 
engage in conscious deliberation. As before, the stereotype is activated and its activation is 
broadcast (in the global workspace or working memory). But this time, the stereotype 
activation is not followed by conscious deliberation. Rather, it directly activates an associated 
goal representation (such as the goal to be rude, polite, or to engage in helping behavior). We 
may assume that the activation of the goal is also conscious, in the sense that it is broadcast, 
and we may assume that the goal is endorsed by the conscious formation of an intention, 
which is then executed with conscious awareness. 
The action is initiated and guided by a conscious intention. This intention is not based 
on conscious reasoning, although it may be based on reasons (which are accessible but not 
accessed in the situation). Either way, the action is clearly intentional, because it is initiated 
and guided by a conscious intention.12 
This case does not involve genuine System 2 processing. The agent is aware of the 
stereotype activation and the goal activation, and the goal is endorsed by the conscious 
                                                
12 As in case 1, this verdict is supported by the standard view, its main rivals in the philosophy of action, and the 
empirical evidence on the folk concept of intentional action provided by Malle & Knobe 1996 and Malle et al. 
2000. 
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formation of an intention. But an engagement of System 2 would require, in addition, that 
individual steps of effortful reasoning are carried out in the central working memory system. 
The action in this case is clearly intentional. I would suggest that our confidence in this 
verdict is to be explained, in part, by the assumption that the action is initiated and guided by 
a conscious intention. This will become clearer when we turn to the next case, where we will 
see that matters are far from straightforward once we remove the assumption that the action is 
initiated and guided by a conscious intention. 
Case 3: Goal pursuit and partial automaticity 
As in case 2, the stereotype is activated and broadcast, and this automatically activates an 
associated goal. But suppose now that the goal activation is not broadcast. The agent, that is, 
is not aware of the goal activation and is therefore not in a position to endorse (or inhibit) the 
goal pursuit by forming a conscious intention. The empirical evidence suggests that such 
automatic goal activation may nevertheless result in automatic goal pursuit (for reviews see 
Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Bargh & Williams 2006, Custers & Aarts 2010). Let us suppose, 
then, that the goal activation initiates and guides an action without conscious awareness. 
How should we judge this case? Is the action intentional? In this case, we need to know 
more. In particular, we need to know whether or not the performance of the action is habitual. 
To see this, return again to Davidson’s example. The agent adds spice to the stew, mindlessly 
and without conscious awareness (as we are implicitly invited to assume). Why does it 
nevertheless seem that the action is intentional? The reason, I suggest, is twofold. First, we 
assume, with Davidson, that the relevant mental attitudes are accessible—if asked, the agent 
could readily declare his or her intention (to add spice in order to improve the taste). Second, 
we are clearly led to believe that the action is habitual and that the agent has the right history 
of habit formation. Clearly, the agent is not adding spice for the first time, and also not just 
for the second or third time. We would assume, rather, that the agent has done this over and 
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over again. And we would assume that the agent did so on some occasions in the past with 
conscious intent. 
With those background assumptions in place, we judge, readily, that the action is 
intentional. In particular, we implicitly assume that there is an underlying habit and an 
appropriate history of habit formation. There are, I suggest, two main types of such an 
appropriate history. Either the habit has been formed by several performances of the action 
with conscious intent. Or, it may be that the agent has acquired the habit in some other way, 
such as by imitation, but has later endorsed the action and its goal by forming a conscious 
intention. In either case, the intentionality of later manifestations of the habit is derivative: the 
intentionality of the action derives from earlier instances of acting with conscious intent. 
Those considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, to our present case 3. If there is an 
appropriate history of habit formation, such that the habit was either formed or endorsed by 
acting on the stereotype activation with conscious intent, then a later manifestation, as in case 
3, is derivatively intentional—provided, as we should add, that the intention is still 
consciously accessible. 
The assessment of such cases becomes more difficult once we remove the assumption 
that there is an appropriate history of habit formation. Davidson’s case would simply appear 
to be very odd without this assumption. Why on earth would one add spice to a stew 
automatically and without awareness if one had no corresponding history of habit formation? 
In case 3, in contrast, there is a possible explanation of how and why the agent acts 
automatically and without awareness. In the literature on implicit bias, it is often assumed that 
we may acquire the relevant stereotype-goal associations without a history of habit formation 
(or conscious endorsement), because it is assumed that we may acquire such associations by 
being exposed to them in our socio-cultural environment. This would explain the association 
between the stereotype and the goal in our present case 3. 
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So, the stereotype is activated, and the agent is aware of this. But the agent is unaware 
of the goal activation and of the subsequent initiation and guidance of behavior. Is the action 
intentional? I am inclined to think that the action is not intentional.13 But there is one 
complication that needs to be addressed here. We assume that the stereotype activation 
influences behavior by automatically activating a goal representation. A goal representation 
is, by definition, a mental state that can initiate and guide action. It has, that is, the functional 
role of an intention in the initiation and guidance of action. And this may be taken to suggest 
that the action is intentional. But what this shows, really, is that we need to be more careful, 
and that we need to make a distinction. We distinguished already between the automatic 
activation of a goal representation and the endorsement of such a goal by the conscious 
formation of an intention. This distinction is by no means ad hoc. One can find various 
incarnations of it in the empirical literature, and evidence from brain imaging studies suggests 
that the workings of automatic goal activations and conscious intentions are implemented by 
distinct regions in the brain (Frith et al. 2000, Bargh 2005, Pacherie & Haggard 2010, for 
instance). There is, that is, good reason to think that the distinction is real, but the terminology 
is optional. One may, for instance, reserve the term “intention” for mental states that have 
been consciously formed. Or one may introduce a technical term in order to distinguish 
between two kinds of intentions. For instance, in the empirical literature it is common to 
distinguish between conscious intentions and “motor intentions”. That is nothing other than 
the distinction between conscious intentions and goal representations (sometimes also called 
“motor representations”). 
                                                
13 As before, this intuition is in line with the standard view and with empirical evidence on the folk concept of 
intentions action (see footnote 11). Note that if an agent has acquired the stereotype-goal association by 
exposure, then the agent is probably unaware of the underlying association. That is, the agent is not only 
unaware of the goal activation in the particular case. But the agent has probably never been aware of the fact that 
the activation of the stereotype activates an associated goal. 
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So, goal representations may be classified as forming a kind of intention. But, of course, 
this terminological decision should not lead one to conclude that all actions that are initiated 
and guided by goal representations are therefore intentional. What matters is not the 
terminology, but the two substantive issues that have already been discussed: Is the action 
habitual? Is the agent aware of the goal activation? Given this, we can uphold the proposed 
claim that the action in case 3 is not intentional, if it is not habitual, and if the agent is not 
aware of the goal activation and its influence on subsequent behavior. 
Note, the suggestion is not that the performance of an intentional action requires 
initiation and guidance by a conscious intention. Rather, the suggestion is that if an action is 
initiated and guided by an automatically activated and unconscious goal representation, and if 
the action has no appropriate history of habit formation (or conscious endorsement), then the 
action is not intentional. In such cases, the action is goal-directed, but not intentional. 
Note, finally, that System 2 is not involved in the performance of the action in any of 
the variations of case 3. But if the action has a history of habit formation (or conscious 
endorsement), then System 2 may have been involved on past occasions, depending on 
whether or not those occasions involved effortful deliberation. 
Case 4: Goal pursuit and full automaticity 
Assume now that the stereotype and the associated goal are activated automatically, and that 
neither the stereotype nor the goal is broadcast. As before, the agent is not in a position to 
endorse (or inhibit) the goal by forming a conscious intention. The empirical evidence 
suggests that the automatic activation of the goal may initiate and guide goal pursuit without 
conscious awareness (Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Aarts et al. 2005, Bargh & Williams 2006, 
Custers & Aarts 2010). 
This is an example of fully automatic and unconscious goal pursuit, and the agent is 
unaware of the stereotype activation as well. As in case 3, we need to consider the agent’s 
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history in order to arrive at a judgment concerning intentionality. It seems, again, that if there 
is an appropriate history of habit formation or conscious endorsement, then the action is 
derivatively intentional, despite the fact that the agent executes the action in the present case 
without awareness. In support of this, consider the following. Suppose that when you drive to 
work in the morning, you take a right turn at the first junction. Sometimes when you approach 
the junction, you are aware of approaching a junction at which you have to turn right, and you 
then automatically prepare for taking the turn. On other occasions, you do not become aware 
of approaching a junction at which you have to turn right, but you automatically prepare for 
taking the turn all the same. In the first case, you are aware of the stimulus, in the second you 
are not. This is analogous to the difference between cases 3 and 4. In case 3 the agent is aware 
of the stereotype activation, in case 4 the agent is unaware. The analogy suggests that this 
difference does not make a difference concerning intentionality. In each of those four cases, 
the action is derivatively intentional if it is the manifestation of a habit with the right history 
(provided that the relevant intention is still accessible). And if there is no such history, the 
action does not seem to be intentional. Further, as in case 3, the action is goal-directed, but 
not intentional. System 2 is not involved in the performance of the action, but it may have 
been involved on past occasions, in the acquisition or endorsement of the relevant habit. 
Case 5: Full automaticity and no goal activation 
As mentioned, the activation of a stereotype may influence behavior either by activating a 
goal or by activating more directly an associated behavioral tendency. Let us consider, then, a 
final case in which the automatic and unconscious activation of a stereotype influences 
behavior by way of automatically activating an associated behavioral tendency, and suppose 
that the agent is unaware of all this (for empirical evidence see Bargh & Chartrand 1999, 
Aarts et al. 2005, Bargh & Williams 2006, Custers & Aarts 2010). 
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As in case 4, the agent is unaware of both the stereotype activation and its influence on 
behavior. And as in cases 3 and 4, we need to consider whether or not the action is the 
manifestation of a habit with the right history. And as the difference in the underlying 
mechanisms appears to be irrelevant, our assessment of intentionality should follow our 
discussion of cases 3 and 4. If the action is the manifestation of a habit with the right history, 
then it is derivatively intentional. If it is not habitual, then it is not intentional, because the 
agent is entirely unaware of being influenced by the activation of a stereotype. As in cases 3 
and 4, System 2 is not involved in the performance of the action, but it may have been 
involved on past occasions, in the acquisition or endorsement of the relevant habit. 
This case shows, though, that there is a sense in which an intentional action may not be 
goal-directed—namely, in the sense that it is not initiated and guided by a goal representation. 
But there is, nevertheless, derivative goal-directedness in such cases, because such actions 
must be derivatively intentional, if they are intentional at all.  
7. The standard view revised 
The discussion of those cases made it clear, I think, that the standard view of intentional 
action is in need of modification and further qualification. Consider, then, the following 
revised version of the standard view, which summarizes the conclusions and suggestions from 
the previous section (in a rough and ready fashion). 
An action is intentional if and only if: 
Either (1) the performance of the action is initiated and guided by a conscious intention. 
Or (2) the action is derivatively intentional. 
An action is derivatively intentional if and only if: 
 25 
Either (2a) the action is the manifestation of a habit that has been formed by performing 
actions of this type with conscious intent (and this intention is still consciously 
accessible and would still be endorsed). 
Or (2b) the action is the manifestation of a habit that has been acquired in some other 
way and has later been endorsed by the conscious formation of an intention (and this 
intention is still consciously accessible and would still be endorsed). 
According to the standard qualification of the standard view (see section 2), intentional action 
does not require that the relevant mental attitudes are consciously accessed—accessibility is 
sufficient. According to the proposed revision, conscious access is also not necessary, but 
accessibility is not sufficient. The agent must either have a conscious intention that initiates 
and guides the action (to satisfy 1), or the agent must have consciously formed the relevant 
intention at some point in the past (to satisfy 2a or 2b). So, according to this account, 
intentional action does depend on conscious intention, but the performance of particular 
intentional actions does not. The account makes no explicit mention of Systems 1 and 2. But 
the discussion of the five cases in the previous section made it clear why and how this account 
of intentional action can be captured within the dual-system theory (in conjunction with the 
global workspace theory of consciousness). 
It is important to note that this account does not require that the agent has at any point 
the conscious intention to acquire the habit. The condition on habit formation (2a) requires 
that the habit is formed by performing the action with conscious intent. This requires, 
typically, that the action is performed or practiced repeatedly, but not that the agent has the 
conscious intention to acquire the habit. Note, further, that the account does not entail that the 
endorsement of a habit (in 2b) must itself be a mental action. The condition requires that the 
habit is endorsed by the formation of a conscious intention, and the formation of a conscious 
intention need not be an action. Arguably, the formation of an intention is an action only if it 
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is motivated by a further desire or intention (such as the desire or intention to settle the 
practical question at hand). It seems perfectly possible that the formation of some intentions is 
not motivated in this way, and it seems perfectly possible that we may consciously acquire 
intentions in this passive or “non-actional” manner (for more on this see Mele 2003: Ch. 9). 
8. Lessons and conclusions 
There is no straightforward way to locate intentional action in the dual-system theory, such as 
by identifying intentional actions with System 2 outputs. But we have seen that the standard 
view of intentional action can be captured within the dual-system theory, and it has emerged 
that doing so suggests plausible modifications and qualifications of the view. Further, we 
have seen that it is important to distinguish between goal representations and conscious 
intentions, or, alternatively, between two kinds of intentions. 
An important lesson is that philosophical accounts of intentional action need to pay 
more attention to the role of consciousness in action. I have suggested that intentional action 
depends on consciousness. Consciousness, that is, must play a role at some point, either in the 
initiation and guidance of the action or during the formation or endorsement of the relevant 
habit. This does not mean that intentional action depends on the involvement of System 2, 
because the conscious endorsement of a goal need not involve System 2 processing, as I have 
argued. 
What can we say about how much of our behavior can qualify as intentional? We can 
conclude that most of our everyday behavior may well be intentional, even if most of it is 
automatic, because most automatic actions may well be habitual and derivatively intentional. 
This, I should note, includes another way in which automatic actions can qualify as 
derivatively intentional. Many automatic actions are sub-routines that are in the service of 
consciously accessible goals and intentions. Common examples are the sub-actions that one 
performs while playing an instrument or while driving a car. This kind of derivative 
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intentionality is included, because the initiation and guidance of such sub-routines is always 
habitual. 
To conclude, then, we have seen that the philosophical standard view of intentional 
action can be captured within the dual-system theory, and we have seen that doing so offers 
important lessons on how to think about the role of consciousness in intentional action. And 
we have seen that the findings from the empirical research on automaticity are not so 
“unbearable” after all, because they do not undermine the assumption that most of our 
everyday behavior can qualify as intentional. 
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